St. John's Law Review
Volume 90, Fall 2016, Number 3

Article 11

Article II Complications Surrounding SEC-Employed
Administrative Law Judges
Thomas C. Rossidis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

FINAL_ROSSIDIS

2/23/2017 5:16 PM

ARTICLE II COMPLICATIONS
SURROUNDING SEC-EMPLOYED
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
THOMAS C. ROSSIDIS†
INTRODUCTION
The country’s top white collar defense attorneys spend a
great deal of time arguing their cases before a Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) administrative law judge (“ALJ”).
Even though the function of an ALJ closely resembles that of an
Article III judge, the SEC is showing no signs of reducing
administrative actions, as ALJs can hear evidence, decide factual
issues, apply legal principles, and issue initial decisions at an
accelerated rate.1
This is especially noticeable as the
“[e]nforcement activity in the first half of fiscal year 2015
indicates that the [SEC] is on track for another strong year of
new enforcement actions filed.”2 This record level of enforcement
activity by the SEC is credited to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).3 As
a result of Dodd-Frank’s central purpose—“[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
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1
Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 798–99
(2013).
2
Sara Gilley, Heather Lazur & Alberto Vargas, SEC Focus on Administrative
Proceedings: Midyear Checkup, LAW 360 (May 27, 2015, 10:25 AM), http://
www.law360.com/articles/659945/sec-focus-on-administrative-proceedings-midyearcheckup [hereinafter Midyear Checkup].
3
Id.
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‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices”4—in 2014 alone, the SEC initiated nearly
1,000 new investigations and filed 755 new enforcement actions.5
Defense attorneys, however, came prepared. In a forum
where the SEC wins nearly 100% of the time, enforcement action
defendants began challenging administrative proceedings against
them in federal court. Such defendants received a pivotal
decision from the Northern District of Georgia in June 2015 and
more recently in November 2015.6 In both cases, district court
Judge Leigh Martin May found that the SEC ALJ hiring process
was likely to be unconstitutional because the ALJs were not
appointed by the SEC Commissioners pursuant to Article II of
the Appointments Clause.7 Therefore, since Judge May’s initial
decision, the SEC has been under a flurry of constitutional
attacks, as the SEC’s breach in “its use of [ALJs] has drawn
other defendants like moths to a flame.”8
There are two constitutional attacks in particular that
gained traction, both of which concern the executorial powers of
Article II. The first issue is whether SEC-hired ALJs are

4
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
5
See Midyear Checkup, supra note 2. However, SEC administrative
enforcement statistics were recently contested by Emory University Law Professor
Urska Velikonja in her law review article. See generally Urska Velikonja, Reporting
Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
901 (2016). The study concluded that “many of the SEC statistics developed to
measure enforcement are deeply flawed” by showing that, between 2002 and 2014,
“[t]he distortion in the defendant count” is due to the fact that a large percentage of
defendants have been counted twice and sometimes even three or more times in the
SEC’s statistics. Id. at 904 n.9, 977. These added actions typically included “followon” enforcement actions—administrative actions that bar individuals from
appearing before the commission who were previously found liable for SEC
violations—and “secondary” enforcement actions—“filed simultaneously against the
same defendant for the same misconduct in court and before the ALJ.” Id. at 935,
935 n.197, 937. Professor Velikonja’s takeaway is that “[o]verstating enforcement
statistics is problematic because it suggests that SEC enforcement is more vigorous
than it really is.” Id. at 958.
6
See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015); see also Ironridge
Glob. IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
7
Ironridge Glob., 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1316; Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319.
8
Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/dealbook/secfinds-itself-in-a-constitutional-conundrum.html.
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considered “inferior Officers” of the United States whose
appointment shall be in compliance with the Appointments
Clause:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.9

If the United States Supreme Court decides SEC ALJs are
inferior officers, then these ALJs are unconstitutionally
appointed because the United States Constitution limits the
power to appoint inferior officers to three sources: “the President
alone,” “the Heads of Departments,” and “the Courts of Law.”10
SEC ALJs are currently hired by the dual efforts of the SEC
Office of Human Resources and the Office of Personnel
Management.11 Both offices conduct their duties and make
decisions without any influence from the SEC Commissioners,
thus making the ALJs’ appointment unconstitutional.12 In
contrast, if the Supreme Court determines that SEC ALJs are
mere employees, then the constitutional appointment framework
does not affect the way ALJs are hired and the Article II
Appointments Clause claim fails.13
Analogous to SEC ALJs, in Freytag v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the Supreme Court addressed whether special
trial judges (“STJs”) are inferior officers.14 Concluding STJs are
inferior officers because they are “established by Law” and
9

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d
1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding that because SEC ALJs are inferior officers, the
ALJ who presided over [the businessman’s] hearing was in conflict with the
Appointments Clause for not being appointed by “the President, a court of law, or a
department head”).
11
See Notice of Filing, Timbervest, LLC, No. 3-15519 (S.E.C. June 4, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-15519-event-139.pdf.
12
See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878.
13
See Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. v. SEC (Lucia II), 832 F.3d 277, 286
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that SEC ALJ’s are employees, as “the Commission’s ALJs
neither have been delegated sovereign authority to act independently of the
Commission nor, by other means established by Congress, do they have the power to
bind third parties, or the government itself, for the public benefit”).
14
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 877–92.
10
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“specified by statute,”15 the Court considered both the Framers’
intent behind the Appointments Clause—to address the
“manipulation of official appointments”16—and the purpose of the
Clause—to “ensure that those who wielded [the power to appoint]
were accountable to political force and the will of the people.”17
The second constitutional issue is whether SEC ALJs’ dual
for-cause removal protection contravenes the Constitution’s
separation of powers. Article II of the Constitution provides that
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”18 As the Supreme Court noted,
“[James] Madison stated on the floor of First Congress, ‘if any
power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the
laws.’ ”19 The underlying purpose of the Clause was to maintain
responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department, since
“[t]he buck stops with the President.”20 In Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States,21 the Court initially explored the issue whether
good-cause tenure protection constitutionally extended to
“principal” officers of independent agencies.22 It was only until
later that Supreme Court decisions answered the question
whether removal protections constitutionally extended to inferior
officers.23
The dual-layered removal protection stems from the
protections granted to both the principal officers of the
independent agency—the SEC Commissioners—and the inferior
officers within those independent agencies—the ALJs. The Court
determined that principal officers of independent agencies shall
only be removed by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.”24 Yet, the issue remains whether
inferior officers shall only be removed by principal agents for
cause. An argument made against SEC ALJs is that their dual-

15

Id. at 881.
Id. at 883.
17
Id. at 884.
18
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
19
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492
(2010) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 463 (1789)).
20
Id. at 492–93.
21
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
22
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493.
23
Id. at 494–95.
24
Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620).
16
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layer removal protection would unconstitutionally interfere with
the President’s control over inferior officers. In Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,25 the
Supreme Court addressed this separation of power issue and
found that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”),
whose
members
are
inferior
officers,
unconstitutionally interfered with the President’s ability to
“ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.”26
This Note argues, first, that SEC ALJs are inferior officers
pursuant to Article II’s Appointments Clause, and second, that
SEC ALJs’ multilevel tenure protection is constitutional.
Because Supreme Court precedent determined that inferior
officers are “established by Law,”27 hold statutory duties and
compensation,28 exercise “significant authority,”29 and operate
under the supervision of an officer appointed by the President
with the consent of the Senate,30 SEC ALJs are inferior officers,
rather than mere employees. Furthermore, since the Supreme
Court also concluded that inferior officers are endowed with
removal protection as it is “deem[ed] best for the public
interest,”31 notwithstanding the narrow PCAOB ruling in Free
Enterprise Fund,32 SEC ALJs’ dual-layer protection is not suspect
of affecting the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws
of the United States.
Part I introduces the legislation underlying both the SEC’s
development and the ALJ hiring process, including the ALJs’
duties and responsibilities within the SEC’s Office of
Enforcement. Moreover, Part I details the framework of the
Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit Court surrounding the Article II
Appointments Clause issues.
Part II begins with the
development of district court cases that first engaged this issue
following the enactment of Dodd-Frank. This Part also looks to
independent agencies outside the SEC to see how those agencies
and Congress responded to the constitutional challenges. Part
25

561 U.S. 477.
Id. at 498.
27
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
28
Id.
29
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
30
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
31
United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
32
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508
(2010).
26

FINAL_ROSSIDIS

778

2/23/2017 5:16 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:773

III then determines that SEC ALJs are inferior officers and are
subject to reappointment by SEC Commissioners. Next, this
Part explores a solution to safeguard the anticipated attacks on
past and pending ALJ decisions by adopting the de facto officer
doctrine.33 Finally, this Part concludes that SEC ALJ dual-layer
tenure protection is constitutionally within the separation of
powers framework.
I.

A.

THE HISTORY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF SEC-HIRED
ALJS
Integration of the Securities Exchange Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act

The 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the “Act”) established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as the agency
responsible for United States federal securities law.34 Acting as
the department heads of the administrative agency, the SEC is
composed of five commissioners (together known as the
“Commission”) who are appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.35
The Commission is
responsible for “appoint[ing] and compensat[ing] officers,
attorneys, economists, examiners, and other employees” so long
as their actions comply with § 4802 of the United State Code (the
“Code”).36 Indeed, § 4802 of the Code indicates that the section
shall be administered consistent with the merit system
principles37 and for the Commission to consult with the Office of

33
The Supreme Court confirmed that the doctrine “confers validity upon acts
performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later
discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment . . . is deficient.” Ryder v.
United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995).
34
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).
35
Id. (stating that each commissioner holds a five-year term in office).
36
Id. § 78d(b)(1). “The Commission may appoint and fix the compensation of
such . . . examiners[] and other employees as may be necessary for carrying out its
functions . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 4802(b) (2012).
37
See 5 C.F.R. § 332.402 (2016), for OPM’s referral procedure and § 332.404 for
its order of selection criteria. See also 5 U.S.C. § 3313 (explaining the order of
qualified applicants).
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Personnel Management (“OPM”) to incorporate their
comprehensive data on prospective ALJ candidates in its hiring
decisions.38
OPM is the primary source for developing the methodology
for ALJ examinations and is the “gatekeeper” for selecting
ALJs;39 however, that is not meant to imply that OPM actually
hires ALJs.40 Rather, it has the authority to (1) recruit and
examine ALJ applicants; (2) assure appointment decisions are
consistent with applicable laws; (3) establish classification
standards; (4) approve personnel actions, such as promotions and
transfers; and (5) ensure the independence of ALJs.41
Accordingly, the appointment responsibilities of ALJs are left to
the agency itself.
Following the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act,
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) in
1946 to further ensure the goals of due process in administrative
proceedings.42 Congress emphasized and answered the concern
that hearing officers should hold an independent status apart
from the hiring and prosecuting agency.43 In contemplation of
this concern, Congress entertained two proposals:
Either
“examiners should be entirely independent of agencies, even to
the extent of being separately appointed,” or “examiners [should]
be selected from agency employees and function merely as
clerks.”44 Although Congress recognized that agencies have a
38

5 U.S.C. § 4802(d)–(f). The OPM oversees federal employment for ALJs and
other civil servants. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 19, Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276
(2d Cir. 2015) (No. 15-2103), 2015 WL 4910839, at *40.
39
Jenna Greene, SEC Nemesis Mark Cuban Strikes Again-but on the Wrong
Side, AM. LAW. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202737427290/
SEC-Nemesis-Mark-Cuban-Strikes-AgainBut-on-the-Wrong-Side.
40
5 C.F.R. § 930.201(d). When an agency employs a new ALJ, it must reimburse
OPM for the costs it laid out for developing and administering the ALJ examination.
Id. § 930.203. OPM is in charge of the merit-selection process in which applicants
take a test, and the raw points are then processed through a complicated formula to
assess the overall score of each applicant. Then, the Chief ALJ of the hiring agency
will receive a list of eligible candidates to choose from, Greene, supra note 39, and a
selection is made from the top three candidates on the list. Notice of Filing, supra
note 11. Finally, an interview committee and the Chief ALJ make a preliminary
selection with the final approval coming from the Commission’s Office of Human
Resources. Id.
41
5 C.F.R. § 930.201(e).
42
92 CONG. REC. 2149 (1946).
43
Id. at 5655.
44
Id. Congress was grappling with the idea that if it were to give examiners
heightened adjudicatory power, then it would also need to make sure the examiners’
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legitimate part in the selection of examiners, it determined that
“examiners are made independent in tenure and compensation.”45
Put differently, Congress inserted a removal provision for ALJs,
which provided that they can only be discharged “for good
cause . . . determined by the Civil Service Commission after
opportunity for [a] hearing.”46
Therefore, by adding these
protections, Congress created enough distance between the
Commission and its ALJs to satisfy the independence concern.
In addition, though the Securities Act supplied authority to
the Commission to delegate its functions to ALJs and other
agency personnel,47 the Commission retained the “discretionary
right” to review the actions of those delegated functions.48 If,
however, the Commission was to decline its exercise to review or
fail to make a review in a timely manner, the ALJ’s decision will
become the final decision of the Commission.49 But even so, the
aggrieved person has the ability to “obtain review of the order in
the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he [or
she] resides or has his [or her] principle place of business, or for
the District of Columbia Circuit.”50 Thus, this multilayered
review process, in conjunction with a separate tenure and
compensation structure,51 was Congress’s attempt to insulate
ALJs from Commission influence.52

appointment was separated from the agencies’ influence. Conversely, if Congress
were to give examiners less power in the administrative proceeding process, then
examiners might become indistinguishable from mere clerks. Id.
45
Id.
46
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 11, 60 Stat. 237, 244
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of title five of the U.S. Code). For
cause is to be determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board, as set up under
the APA. Harold J. Krent, Symposium, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within
the Executive Branch, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083, 1108 (2015). In addition to
their tenure protection, ALJs also have life tenure because they do not serve for a
specific period of years in office. Barnett, supra note 1, at 807.
47
15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012); see also id. § 77u (establishing that hearings can
be held before the Commission or officers designated by the Commission).
48
Id. § 78d-1(b).
49
Id. § 78d-1(c).
50
Id. § 78y(a)(1). Such a filing to the court of appeals must be done within sixty
days after the order becomes final. Id.
51
See generally 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012).
52
See 92 CONG. REC. 5656 (1946).
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The Operation of the ALJ System within the SEC’s Office of
Enforcement

The SEC and other independent agencies are required to
appoint as many ALJs as necessary to conduct proceedings
efficiently and fairly.53
Currently, the SEC’s Office of
Administrative Law Judges is composed of five ALJs.54 When the
Commission commences an “order instituting proceeding” to hold
an investigatory hearing,55 it directs one of the ALJs to conduct a
public administrative proceeding to determine the truthfulness of
the allegations.56 After the Commission designates an ALJ as an
independent judicial officer,57 the ALJ will conduct a public
hearing at one of multiple locations throughout the country.58
By statute, an SEC-hired ALJ is a hearing officer,59 a
position that carries significant authority because unless the
Commission specifically designates a hearing to an ALJ, the
hearing officer presiding over a matter would be the Commission
itself or an individual Commissioner.60 Moreover, as authorized
under the APA, ALJs must conduct themselves similarly to court
judges during administrative proceedings or else they risk
disqualification from the agency at any time.61 On that basis,
ALJs are given substantial power throughout the hearing process
to: (1) administer oaths and affirmations; (2) issue subpoenas;
(3) rule on evidence; (4) take depositions; (5) hold settlement
conferences; (6) demand parties’ attendance;62 and (7) issue
sanctions.63 Though ALJs serve as finders of fact and law, “there
is no jury[,] [and] [t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
53

5 U.S.C. § 3105.
ALJ Initial Decisions: Administrative Law Judges, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/
alj/aljdec.shtml (last modified Feb. 6, 2017).
55
17 C.F.R. § 201.101(a)(4) (2016).
56
Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/alj (last
modified Jan. 26, 2017).
57
17 C.F.R. § 201.110.
58
Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 56.
59
17 C.F.R. § 201.101(5).
60
See id.; see also id. § 201.110.
61
5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012). ALJs participating in the decision of the proceeding
must operate in an “impartial manner.” Id.
62
See id. § 556(c); see generally 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (emphasizing that no
provision of the Rules of Practice is meant to curtail the powers of the ALJs unless it
explicitly states to the contrary); 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (“[T]he hearing officer may
receive relevant evidence and shall exclude all evidence that is irrelevant,
immaterial or unduly repetitious.”).
63
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 201.180.
54
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Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.”64 Accordingly, despite
certain similarities between the role of an ALJ and that of an
Article III federal judge, the rules of procedure and practice vary
significantly between the two types of proceedings.
Above all, ALJs have the power to make initial decisions.65
“that
When
an
ALJ
drafts
an
initial
decision,66
decision . . . becomes the decision of the agency without further
proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of,
the agency” within the time period that is provided under the
Rules of Practice.67 If the Commission decides to review the
initial decision, or a party petitions for review of an initial
decision, the Commission reviews de novo and has full discretion
to “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or remand for further
proceedings, in whole or in part.”68 Although the Commission
“retains ‘all the power,’ ”69 ALJ decisions should not be quickly
dismissed as mere recommendations or advisory in nature. After
all, absent an appeal or an elected review by the Commission, the
initial decision becomes the final decision without any
modifications.
C.

The Game-Changing Impact of Dodd-Frank on SEC
Administrative Hearings

The administrative process, although different from Article
III courts, was not nearly as concerning for financial individuals
and entities until Dodd-Frank provisions were enacted in 2010.
To incentivize the use of administrative enforcement actions,
Dodd-Frank enabled the SEC to obtain similar remedies from
administrative proceedings as it would from federal court
actions, such as the imposition of monetary penalties.70
64
David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1166
(2016).
65
5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
66
See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
67
5 U.S.C. § 557(b). Depending on a multitude of factors, such as nature,
complexity, and urgency, the Commission will specify a time period for the ALJ to
conduct the proceeding and file an initial decision. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2).
Typically, ALJs will be issued either a 120, 210 or 300 day time period. Id.
68
Id. § 201.411. The Commission provides at least some deference to the ALJ
decision because it must consider the decision during the administrative appeal.
Barnett, supra note 1, at 807.
69
Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)).
70
See Stephen Joyce, SEC To Use Administrative Cases More, Despite Defense
Bar Complaints, Officials Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 17, 2014), http://
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Initially, the 1934 Act limited the SEC to imposing civil
money penalties only on enumerated SEC-regulated entities
without first having to seek an order from federal court.71 With
the passage of § 929P(a) of Dodd-Frank, however, the SEC’s
administrative powers have greatly expanded.72 Pursuant to
that section, Dodd-Frank permits the SEC to impose civil money
penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings brought against “any
person” or unregistered entity.73 Nonetheless, even though the
SEC was granted greater latitude to order both regulated and
nonregulated entities before its ALJs, the majority of its
proceedings continue to involve only SEC-regulated individuals
or firms.74
Since the inception of Dodd-Frank, the number of
administrative proceedings has increased by fifty percent, as it
allows almost any type of securities case to be heard before an
SEC ALJ.75 Specifically, the number of ALJ proceedings has
gone from 352 in 2009, pre-Dodd-Frank, to 610 in 2014.76 The
SEC categorizes the types of matters brought before its ALJs into
one of eleven primary classifications: (1) Broker-Dealer;
(2) Delinquent Filings; (3) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;
(4) Insider
Trading;
(5) Investment
Advisors/Investment
www.bna.com/sec-administrative-cases-n17179911882. But, according to Professor
Urska Velikonja, the Commission did not bring cases before its ALJs to seek an inhouse advantage. Mike Sacks, SEC In–House Venue is Target of House Bill, NAT’L
L.J. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202741222050/SECInHouse-Venue-is-Target-of-House-Bill. In 2009, the SEC won 90.6% of its federal
court actions. In 2010, the SEC won 92.6% of its federal court actions. And in 2011,
though the SEC had a lower winning percentage in federal court, Professor
Velikonja ultimately attributed that to the increase in insider-trading cases. Id.
71
See generally Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 21–25, 48 Stat.
881, 899–902 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)). SEC-regulated entities
include: “broker, dealer, investment adviser, investment company, municipal
securities dealer, government securities broker, government securities dealer,
registered public accounting firm . . . or transfer agent.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3.
72
Michael Volkov, Slowing Down the SEC Administrative Train, VOLKOV L.
BLOG (Sept. 8. 2015), http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2015/09/slowing-down-the-secadministrative-train.
73
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of title fifteen of the U.S. Code).
74
Zaring, supra note 64, at 1175.
75
Compare SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2009 TABLE 2 (2009),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2009.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL 2009], with SEC,
SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2014 TABLE 2 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/
about/secstats2014.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL 2014].
76
See FISCAL 2009, supra note 75; FISCAL 2014, supra note 75.
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Companies; (6) Issuer Reporting and Disclosure; (7) Market
Manipulation; (8) Miscellaneous; (9) Municipal Securities &
Public Pensions; (10) Securities Offering; and (11) Transfer
Agent.77 Before the enactment of Dodd-Frank, “charges over
violations to the securities laws that involved corporate officers
or those trading on inside information had to be brought in a
federal district court, if the agency was seeking a penalty like a
fine or ban from serving as an officer or director of a company.”78
This limited the types of cases that came before ALJs. Both
historically and presently, the three major enforcement action
classifications brought before an ALJ are Broker-Dealer,
Delinquent Filings, and Investment Advisors.79 In effect, DoddFrank has changed the landscape of the securities industry by
taking traditionally litigated cases out of the federal court
system. Parties to these administrative proceedings are not
acquiescing as discussed herein.80
D. Development of the Article II Issues within the United States
Supreme Court
Freytag v. Commissioner81: Defining “Inferior” Officer

1.

The line between inferior officers and mere employees is far
from clear. In the majority opinion by Justice Blackmun, the
Freytag Court found that special tax judges are inferior officers
whose appointments must conform to the Appointments Clause,82

77

FISCAL 2014, supra note 75.
Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over the Constitutionality of Some
of Its Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://dealbook.ny
times.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-challenges-over-the-constitutionality-of-some-of-itscourt-proceedings.
79
See FISCAL 2009, supra note 75; SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA, FISCAL
2010, Table 2 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2010.pdf; FISCAL 2014, supra
note 75.
80
The Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, Andrew Ceresney, indicated
that “while we are using administrative proceedings more, we are still bringing
significant numbers of contested cases in district courts. And our use of the
administrative forum is eminently proper, appropriate, and fair to respondents.”
Andrew Ceresney, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section
Fall Meeting, SEC (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370543515297.
81
501 U.S. 868 (1991).
82
Id. at 881.
78
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which declares that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”83
In Freytag, the Court addressed where STJs fit on the
inferior officer to mere employee spectrum. The United States
Tax Court is an Article I court—not an Article III court—and is
composed of nineteen judges that are appointed by the
Executive.84 The Chief Judge of the Tax Court is authorized by
statute to appoint STJs and assign them to certain specified
proceedings and, under a separate subsection, assign them to
“any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate.”85
The first three subsections of the statute permit the Chief Tax
Judge not only to authorize STJs to hear and report on a case,
but also to allow those judges to render a decision.86 Yet, the
fourth subsection authorizes STJs only to prepare proposed
findings, leaving the actual decisions to the Tax Court.87
The taxpayer defendants in Freytag argued that STJs are
inferior officers who must be appointed in compliance with the
Appointments Clause.88
Specifically, they contended that
because subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3) authorized STJs to issue
actual decisions with regard to specific types of proceedings, the
catchall phrase in subsection (4) was meant to leave only minor
cases for them to write proposed decisions.89 The taxpayers’
stronger argument, however, was that STJs exercised significant
authority even where they lacked the authority to enter a final
83

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870–71. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV.
643 (2004), for a full discussion on the differences between Article III courts and
Article I tribunals. On the surface, Article III judges enjoy life tenure in good
behavior and protection from salary reductions, while Article I judges lack both
salary and tenure protections. Id. at 646.
85
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 871 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(b) (2012)). For purposes
of the Freytag analysis, “the statute” refers to § 7443A(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code. In 1991, the statute authorized the chief judge to assign STJs to “ ‘(1) any
declaratory judgment proceeding,’ ‘(2) any proceeding under § 7463,’ ‘(3) any
proceeding’ in which the deficiency or claimed overpayment does not exceed $10,000,
and ‘(4) any other proceeding which the Chief Judge may designate.’ ” Id. at 873
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(b)).
86
Id. at 873 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(c)).
87
Id. It is clear that the fourth subsection states that the “Chief Judge may
assign ‘any other proceeding’ to a special trial judge for duties short of ‘mak[ing] the
decision.’ ” Id. (alteration in original).
88
Id. at 877.
89
Id. at 876.
84
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decision.90 Finally, the taxpayers asserted that such judges were
unconstitutional because, as inferior officers, they were not
appointed by “the President,” “the Heads of Departments,” or
“the Courts of Law.”91
On the other hand, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(“CIR”) contended that, due to the all-encompassing language in
subsection four of the statute, STJs do no more than merely
assist the Tax Court through their opinions as recommendations
with respect to all disputes.92 Furthermore, CIR asserted that
the first three subsections of § 7443A(b) were meant to cover only
minor matters, limiting STJs’ actual decision-making power to
those minor issues.93 Accordingly, CIR defined such judges to be
mere employees who are not subject to constitutional constraints,
as they do not hold significant authority.94
The Court found that CIR’s argument failed because “[t]he
fact that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may
be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments
Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution.”95
Although the Court held in favor of CIR’s broad interpretation of
subsection (b)(4),96 it determined that regardless of whether STJs
were restricted to making only proposed decisions under one
subsection, the first three subsections of the statute permitted
them to exercise independent authority, which is the hallmark of
an inferior officer.97
The Court ultimately concluded that STJs were inferior
officers based on their significant “duties and discretion.”98
Without having to distinguish the first three subsections from
the fourth subsection, the Court found that STJs were
90

See id. at 880–82.
Id. at 878, 880.
92
Id. at 880. The legislative history supports the determination that subsection
(b)(4) was intended to remove the maximum amount in dispute to expand the
authority of STJs. Id. at 874 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1568 (1984)).
However, the broader coverage given to STJs came with the caveat of only being
authorized to write proposed opinions, leaving the formal decisions to be entered by
a tax court judge. Id.
93
Id. at 876.
94
Id. at 880–81.
95
Id. at 882.
96
Id. at 877 (holding that STJs can be assigned to any tax proceeding,
regardless of its complexity or amount, but only to prepare a recommended opinion).
97
See id. (noting that STJs hear and decide cases under the first three
subsections).
98
Id. at 881.
91
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“established by Law” and their “duties, salary, and means of
appointment” were specified by statute.99 Even more to the
point, the Court found that STJs’ tasks—which included taking
testimony, conducting trials, ruling on admissibility of evidence,
and enforcing compliance with discovery orders—were
significant.100
Accordingly, even with the discrepancy of
authority allocated to STJs under the various subsections of
§ 7443(b) of the Code, 101 the Court held that they exercised
authority “inconsistent with the classifications of ‘lesser
functionaries’ or employees.”102
Six years later, in Edmond v. United States,103 the Supreme
Court found that military appellate judges, specifically, judges on
the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, were also inferior
officers.104 Edmond expanded the bright line differences between
officers and non-officers when it concluded that inferior officers
have their “work . . . directed and supervised at some level by
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the
advice and consent of the Senate.”105 Therefore, the Court
determined that judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal—who do
not have the power to render final decisions106—were inferior
officers for the sole reason that their work was supervised by the
Judge Advocate General and the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces.107
Landry v. FDIC108: D.C. Circuit Court’s Interpretation of
Freytag Decision in the Context of ALJs as Inferior Officers

2.

In 2000, in the context of independent agencies, such as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals decided the question of whether ALJs were
considered inferior officers.109 Similar to the Freytag Court, the
99

Id.
Id. at 881–82.
101
Id. at 881 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam)).
102
Id. at 880–81 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126, 126 n.162).
103
520 U.S. 651 (1997).
104
Id. at 666.
105
Id. at 663.
106
Id. at 665.
107
Id. at 666.
108
204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
109
Id. at 1132; see also id. at 1128 (noting that the principle issue was whether
FDIC’s appointment of the ALJ violated the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution).
100
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D.C. Circuit also acknowledged that “[t]he line between ‘mere’
employees and inferior officers is anything but bright.”110
However, the Landry court distinguished its conclusion from
Freytag’s and found that ALJs are not the same as STJs and,
therefore, were not inferior officers because they did not hold
comparable final decision making power.111
In Landry, the FDIC notified a senior bank officer that it
intended to bring an order against him for conduct that
threatened the integrity of a federally insured bank.112 The FDIC
assigned the matter to its ALJ for a formal administrative
hearing.113 After two weeks, the ALJ issued a proposed decision
against the bank officer, who then appealed the ALJ initial
decision to the FDIC Board of Directors.114 In its final decision,
the FDIC Directors agreed with the ALJ decision and finalized
their action against the bank officer.115 Finally, the bank officer
appealed the final decision to the D.C. Circuit and argued that
the FDIC’s ALJ appointment method violated the Appointments
Clause.116
The D.C. Circuit emphasized that, unlike the STJs in
Freytag, who render final decisions under the first three
subsections of § 7443(b) of the Code, FDIC ALJs recommend
decisions to the FDIC Board, since only the FDIC Board can
render final decisions.117 In addition, unlike the statutory
provisions that indicate the Tax Court defers to STJ findings,118
the court found that the FDIC makes their own factual findings
de novo without relying solely on the ALJ’s finding.119
110

Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1134.
112
Id. at 1128.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1133.
118
Id.
119
Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 308.40(c) (2016)).
However, the concurring opinion made a strong argument that an ALJ’s
recommended decision subject to de novo review is strikingly similar to the proposed
findings and recommendations of a federal magistrate judge under the review of a
district judge. Id. at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). It is well settled that federal magistrate judges are inferior officers under
Article II. Id. Nevertheless, even if there were no similarities between the two, “[d]e
[n]ovo review does not mean that the ALJ’s recommended decisions are without
influence.” Id. at 1143 n.3.
111
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However, the court conceded that there were many
similarities between ALJs and STJs. Both were “established by
Law” and statutory provisions determine their “duties, salary,
and means of appointment.”120 Moreover, both “take testimony,
conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence,
and . . . enforce compliance with discovery orders.”121 Even with
those similarities, the court determined that Freytag came out
the way it did because of the critical final decision making power
given to the STJs.122 Accordingly, the court held that the FDIC
ALJ was not an inferior officer subject to the constitutional
requirements of the Appointments Clause.123
A concurring opinion argued that the court wrongly
distinguished STJs from ALJs,124 as no relevant differences
existed between the two.125 Relying on the Supreme Court
decision in Edmond v. United States, the concurrence argued
that whether or not ALJs can render final decisions should not be
dispositive because inferior officers have their work “directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate.”126 In conclusion, the concurring opinion argued that
because ALJs are supervised by the review of the FDIC Board
members, who are Article II principle agents, they are inferior
officers.127
3.

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board 128: Dual-Layer Tenure Protection of Inferior Officers

Once a group is designated as inferior officers, the next
question is whether an inferior officer’s dual-layer tenure
protection unconstitutionally insulates the position from
Presidential control.129 In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court
examined whether “the President [is] restricted in his ability to
120
Id. at 1133 (majority opinion) (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881
(1991). See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57, 3105, 5372 (2012).
121
Id. at 1134 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 1140 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
125
Id. at 1141.
126
Id. at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).
127
Id. at 1143.
128
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
129
Id. at 492.
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remove a principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability
to remove an inferior officer, even though that inferior officer
determines the . . . laws of the United States.”130 The Court held
that such dual-layer tenure protection ran contrary to Article II,
emphasizing that the President’s judgment should not be
hindered by a principal officer’s difference of opinion.131
The Supreme Court found that the five members, who
together made up the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (the “Board” or “PCAOB”), were indeed inferior officers.132
The Court comprehensively laid out PCAOB’s authority:
The Board is charged with enforcing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
the securities laws, the Commission’s rules, its own rules, and
professional accounting standards. To this end, the Board may
regulate every detail of an accounting firm’s practice, including
hiring and professional development, promotion, supervision of
audit work, the acceptance of new business and the
continuation of old, internal inspection procedures, [and]
professional ethics rules.133

PCAOB did not require supervision to promulgate auditing or
ethical standards, perform routine inspections of all accounting
firms, or initiate formal investigations and disciplinary
proceedings.134
The Board was also able to issue “severe
sanctions” in its disciplinary hearings, including money penalties
of fifteen million dollars.135 Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
placed the Board under the SEC’s oversight, particularly in the
context of issuing sanctions, the Board possessed significant
discretion that was insulated from the SEC’s control.136
Since PCAOB members were inferior officers, the Court
proceeded to the dual-layer tenure protection issue. Removal
protections offered to both SEC Commissioners and PCAOB
members led to the multi-tiered protection.137 Though SEC
130

Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 484.
132
Id. at 510. The five-member Board is appointed by the SEC to staggered fiveyear terms. Id. at 484. Although the Board members themselves are considered
inferior officers, the PCAOB was created as a private “nonprofit corporation,”
allowing the Board to recruit employees from the private sector. Id. at 484–85 (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (b), (f)(4), 7219 (2012)).
133
Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 486.
137
Id. at 495–96.
131
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“Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President
except [for] . . . ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office,’ ”138 the issue is whether the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, which enabled the Commissioners to remove
Board members in “limited instances for willful misconduct or
unreasonable failure to enforce certain rules and standards,”139 is
constitutional. Thus, because Article II of the Constitution states
that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America,”140 an accounting firm registered with
the Board argued that PCAOB’s multi-tiered protection removed
the President’s control over the Board members by requiring the
approval of the Commission.141
The Court held that this added level of protection “chang[ed]
the nature” of the President’s control.142 Its concern was that the
President could not simply hold the Board accountable if there
was a disagreement with any of the Board’s determinations, but
rather, he could only hold the Commission accountable.143
Accordingly, the Court found that PCAOB’s tenure protection
provision was unconstitutional.144 The majority made clear its
decision was not controlling on other inferior officers; its
conclusion was specifically tailored to the President’s control over
PCAOB—“the regulator of first resort and the primary law
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy.”145
Justice Breyer—joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor—dissented on the ground that two layers of
protection would not impose any more serious limitation upon
the President than a single layer of protection would impose.146
138
Id. at 487 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620
(1935)). The Court did not prevent Congress from providing “good-cause tenure” to
principal officers of independent agencies. Id. at 493. In addition to regulatory
commissions invented during the Progressive Era, independent agencies were also
created during the New Deal Era. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770–71
(2013) (“[T]he purpose of these agencies’ structural features was . . . to foster[]
independence from the President.”).
139
Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1349, 1350 (2012).
140
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
141
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
142
Id. at 496.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 492.
145
Id. at 507–08.
146
Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The dissent’s unease stemmed from the statutory provisions of
the PCAOB, which illustrated that the SEC had authority over
the Board’s investigatory power.147 Therefore, Justice Breyer
argued that since the SEC had control over the Board and the
President had control over the Commissioners, “then, as a
practical matter, the President’s control over the Board should
prove sufficient as well.”148 Additionally, the dissent asserted
that PCAOB’s creation in response to “a series of celebrated
accounting debacles”149 created a strong justification to insulate
PCAOB members from “losing their jobs due to political
influence.”150
Moreover, the dissent noted that the majority was vague in
concluding that such unconstitutional dual-layer protection
would apply to all inferior officers.151 Indeed, the majority
opinion even expressed that it was certain the ruling pertained to
the PCAOB.152 The dissent was also troubled by how the Court
would apply its holding to other government personnel
designated as inferior officers,153 “putting their job security and
their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at
risk.”154

147
Id. at 528–29. Pursuant to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the dissent listed six
reasons why the Commission had full authority: (1) a PCAOB rule could not take
effect without the Commission’s approval; (2) the Commission can “ ‘abrogate, delete
or add to’ any [PCAOB] rule” so long as it furthered the purpose of the securities and
accounting-oversight laws; (3) it can “enhance, modify, cancel, reduce, or require the
remission of” any sanction the Board imposed; (4) it can restrict PCAOB’s inspection
and investigation power; (5) it can conduct its own investigation within PCAOB; and
(6) it can relieve the Board of any responsibility if doing so is in the best interest of
the public. Id. (alterations omitted).
148
Id. at 530.
149
Id. at 484 (majority opinion).
150
Id. at 531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151
Id. at 536.
152
Supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent listed
all the Supreme Court decisions that attempted to define the term “inferior officer,”
depicting complete ambiguity in the term. Id. at 539–40. Moreover, the dissent also
included the numerous government positions that the Supreme Court determined to
be officers. Id. at 540. Among other positions, the dissent also included the FCC’s
managing director, the FTC’s secretary, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission’s general counsel, and more generally, bureau chiefs, general counsels,
and administrative law judges, as inferior officers. Id.
154
Id. at 541.
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II. FINANCIAL DEFENDANTS SEEK EQUITABLE REMEDY USING
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
SEC administrative proceedings have become the buzz
around the financial industry throughout 2015.155 Because DoddFrank casted a wide net for SEC administrative proceedings—
keeping financial defendants out of federal court—these
defendants sought to cure their inability to engage in discovery
and to expand the compressed hearing schedule set forth in the
Rules of Procedure.156 In response, defense lawyers asserted that
administrative proceedings are unconstitutional pursuant to
Article II because (1) ALJs are inferior officers who are not
appointed by heads of departments and (2) ALJs’ accountability
is insulated from two layers of tenure protection that hinders
Presidential removal.157
A.

Article II’s Impact on the SEC

Federal courts are inundated with cases that seek an answer
to the constitutionality of SEC-hired ALJs. District courts have
taken different approaches on this issue, and there is also a
recent split of authority among the Tenth and D.C. Circuit
Courts.158 However, other courts concluded that they lack
jurisdiction.159 Moreover, district courts rarely reached the

155

See generally Jean Eaglesham, SEC Fights Challenges to Its In-House
Courts, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-fightschallenges-to-its-in-house-courts-1434927977; Henning, supra note 78.
156
See Molly M. White & Louis D. Greenstein, SEC Proposes To Amend Rules
Governing Administrative Proceedings, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/united
states/x/431430/Securities/SEC+Proposes+to+Amend+Rules+Governing+Administra
tive+Proceedings (last updated Oct. 2, 2015).
157
See Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Appointments Clause
Problem with ALJs, REUTERS BLOG (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2015/06/17/why-the-sec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-withaljs.
158
Compare Lucia II, 832 F.3d 277, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that “there is
no indication Congress intended [SEC ALJs] to be synonymous with ‘Officers of the
United States’ under the Appointments Clause”), with Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d
1168, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (“SEC ALJs
carry out ‘important functions,’ and ‘exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the Untied States.’ The SEC’s power to review its ALJs does not transform
them into lesser functionaries. Rather, it shows the ALJs are inferior officers
subordinate to the SEC commissioners.”).
159
See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1237 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding “it ‘fairly
discernible’ from the review scheme provided in 15 U.S.C. § 78y that Congress
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double-layer tenure protection issue because enforcement action
defendants were able to prevail on proving a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits using only the Appointments
Clause issue.160
1.

Federal District Court Decisions

Although the D.C. Circuit Court in Landry v. FDIC was the
first appellate court to issue a decision in connection with the
appointment of ALJs,161 the district courts in the Southern
District of New York and Northern District of Georgia are also
familiar with these issues.162
In the Northern District of Georgia, Judge May ruled on
whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers to determine if the
appointment of the ALJs violated Article II.163 Despite the
Eleventh Circuit vacating and remanding her judgment with
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,164 this Note uses
Judge May’s findings to substantiate the inferior officer
constitutional issue. In Hill, the SEC brought an insider trading
case pursuant to § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act against a
self-employed real estate developer—an individual who was
unregistered with the SEC.165 The SEC sought a cease-anddesist order, a civil penalty, and disgorgement.166
The district court adopted the Freytag analysis to illustrate
that ALJs are categorized as inferior officers.167 The court found
that ALJs (1) exercise “significant authority;” (2) are established
by law with statutory “duties, salary, and means of
appointment;” and (3) are permanent employees that “take
testimony, conduct trial, rule on the admissibility of evidence,

intended the respondents’ claims to be resolved first in the administrative forum”);
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that Congress intended the
SEC’s administrative scheme “to preclude district court jurisdiction” (quoting Elgin
v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2131 (2012))).
160
Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and
remanded 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
161
See supra Section I.D.2 (explaining the Landry decision that FDIC ALJs are
employees and not subject to Article II constitutional constraints).
162
See generally Duka v. SEC (Duka II), No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL
5547463 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297.
163
Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1316–19.
164
825 F.3d at 1252.
165
Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1301.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 1317.
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and . . . issue sanctions.”168 The court, however, conceded that
ALJs do not have final order authority to the same degree as
STJs in Freytag.169 Even so, the court distinguished Landry—
which held FDIC ALJs are mere employees due to their inability
to render final decisions170—and concluded that the powers of
STJs were “nearly identical” to those of the ALJs.171 Finally, it
rejected the Commission’s argument that since Congress
established by statute that ALJs are hired through the Office of
Human Resources, and because Congress is aware of the
Appointments Clause, ALJs must be employees.172 Rather, the
court found it would be unconstitutional for “Congress
[to] . . . ’decide’ an ALJ is an employee, but then give [the ALJ]
the powers of an inferior officer.”173
Just as in Hill, the Southern District of New York
(“S.D.N.Y.”) in Duka v. SEC concluded that SEC-hired ALJs are
inferior officers.174 The Duka court quoted the reasoning and
holding from Judge May’s opinion in Hill.175 Both courts
analogized ALJs to the STJs in Freytag and thus, disagreed with
the D.C. Circuit’s outcome in Landry.176
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit also weighed in on the issue.177 Unlike the circuit court’s
reasoning in Landry that focused primarily on the SEC ALJ’s
lack of final decision-making power, the Bandimere court found
168

Id.
Id. at 1318, 1318 n.10.
170
See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.
171
Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1318.
172
Id. at 1319.
173
Id. Judge May, however, did not definitively conclude that the Appointments
Clause was violated by the inferior office status of ALJs. Rather, she decided that
because “SEC ALJ[s] [were] not appointed by the President, a department head, or
the Judiciary,” the ALJ’s “appointment [was] likely unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis
added). The court also did not decide on the second constitutional issue regarding
dual tenure protections. Id. at 1319 n.12.
174
Duka II, No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL 5547463, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
17, 2015) (“[ALJs] ‘exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States,” ’ their positions are ‘established by law,’ their ‘duties, salary, and means of
appointment for that office are specified by statute,’ and, in the course of carrying
out their ‘important functions,’ . . . ALJs ‘take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the
admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders.’ ” (citations omitted)).
175
Duka v. SEC (Duka I), No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL 4940057, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015).
176
Id. at *2 (“The Court is aware that Landry v. FDIC . . . is to the contrary.”).
177
Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016).
169
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that final decision-making power is just one factor to consider,178
as the inferior officer-mere employee distinction should hinge on
the ALJs duties as a whole.179 In addition to finding that SEC
ALJs are established by the APA and “receive career
appointments,”180 the court found that they “exercise significant
discretion in performing ‘important functions,’ ” such as
(1) making credibility findings, (2) “issu[ing] initial decisions that
declare respondents liable and impose sanctions,” and
(3) “sett[ing] aside, mak[ing] permanent, limit[ing], or
suspend[ing] temporary sanctions that the SEC itself has
imposed.”181 Therefore, just like the United States Supreme
Court held in Freytag, the Tenth Circuit found SEC ALJs to be
inferior officers whose hiring process violates the Appointments
Clause.182
However, a second S.D.N.Y. judge, in Tilton v. SEC, never
reached the Article II constitutional issues for procedural
reasons.183 Unlike Landry, where the D.C. Circuit’s judicial
review of the constitutionality of those proceedings occurred after
the administrative proceedings, the Tilton case was still at the
administrative level, preventing the court of appeals from
reviewing it until after the SEC rendered a final decision.184
Therefore, the court declined to preside over the constitutional
claims because it found that it did not have jurisdiction over the
parties.185
In addition, all four cases acknowledged that SEC ALJs are
not appointed by the Commissioners. The recent Duka I decision
also highlighted the disclosures made by the SEC in a separate
case, In re Timbervest,186 which outlined the hiring process of its
ALJs.
Specifically, the affidavit illustrated that the
Commissioners did not have any impact or governance over the
ALJ selection process.187 Accordingly, in the event ALJs are

178

Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1182.
180
Id. at 1179.
181
Id. at 1180–81.
182
Id. at 1182–83
183
No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 WL 4006165, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015),
aff’d, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016).
184
Id. at *6.
185
Id. at *13.
186
See Duka I, 2015 WL 4940057, at *2.
187
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
179
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inferior officers, there is a clear violation of the Appointments
Clause and Congress will have to alter the SEC’s appointment
procedure to come within constitutional boundaries.
2.

Recent SEC “Final” Decisions

In stark contrast from federal courts, the SEC came down
with two final decisions that fought against the notion that its
ALJs are inferior officers. First, in In re Raymond J. Lucia
Companies, Inc.,188 the SEC held that “a Commission ALJ is a
‘mere employee’—not an ‘officer’—and thus the appointment of a
Commission ALJ is not covered by the Clause.”189 The SEC
supported its conclusion with the same reasoning that reiterated
the holding in Landry.190 The Commission found that since ALJs
cannot render final decisions, they function “as aides who assist
the Board in its duties, not officers who exercise significant
authority independent of . . . supervision.”191
In addition, it
reasoned that ALJs’ status differed from STJs’ status in Freytag
because STJs render final decisions in “significant, fully-litigated
proceedings.”192 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, which denied petition to review the SEC’s Lucia decision,
further held:
[T]he Commission could have chosen to adopt regulations
whereby an ALJ’s initial decision would be deemed a final
decision of the Commission . . . without any additional
Commission action. But that is not what the Commission has
done. . . . First, it has afforded itself additional time to
determine whether it wishes to order review even when no
petition for review is filed. Second, upon deciding not to order

188

Lucia I, Release No. 4190, 2015 WL 5172953 (S.E.C. Sept. 3, 2015). The D.C.
Circuit denied the petition to review the SEC’s decision. Lucia II, 832 F.3d 277, 277
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
189
Lucia I, 2015 WL 5172953, at *2, 21.
190
The D.C. Circuit Court held that even though Landry “did not resolve the
constitutional status of ALJs for all agencies . . . [it] is the law of the circuit.” Lucia
II, 832 F.3d at 286 (citations omitted) (determining that “the Commission’s
regulations on the scope of its ALJ’s authority are no less controlling than the FDIC
regulations to which [the D.C. Circuit] looked in Landry”).
191
Lucia I, 2015 WL 5172953, at *21. The D.C. Circuit Court noted, “[T]he main
criteria for drawing the line between inferior Officers and employees . . . are (1) the
significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in
reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions.” Lucia II, 832 F.3d at
284 (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
192
Lucia I, 2015 WL 5172953, at *23.
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review, the Commission issues an order stating that it has
decided not to review the initial decision and setting the date
when the sanctions, if any, take effect.193

Second, in In re Timbervest, LLC,194 the SEC bolstered its
reasoning it previously used in In re Raymond J. Lucia
Companies, Inc. The Commission found that an SEC registered
investment adviser wrongly argued the differences between
FDIC ALJs in Landry and SEC ALJs, as it did no more than
illustrate a mere difference in terminology.195
Thus, the
Commission again thought it was appropriate to distinguish SEC
ALJs from STJs: (1) ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo; (2) ALJ
decisions are not final unless the Commission says otherwise;
and (3) ALJs cannot enforce subpoenas without “an order from a
federal district court to compel compliance.”196 Accordingly, the
SEC found that ALJs cannot be considered officers for the
purpose of Article II.197
In In re Timbervest, the SEC also concluded on the dual forcause tenure protection issue.198 The Commission distinguished
ALJs from PCAOB Board members in Free Enterprise Fund. It
noted that the Court turned on the fact that the PCAOB tenure
structure ran “contrary to ‘Article II’s vesting of the executive
power in the President,’ including the President’s obligation to
The
‘ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.’ ”199
Commission determined that the Supreme Court did not
establish a categorical rule prohibiting two layers of for-cause
removal.200 Therefore, the Commission rephrased the relevant
issue to “whether the removal restrictions [on SEC-hired ALJs]
[were] of such a nature that they imped[ed] the President’s
ability to perform his constitutional duty.”201
The Commission cited four reasons for concluding that the
dual-layer tenure protection did not infringe on Presidential
removal powers.202 First, the Court in Free Enterprise Fund
193

Lucia II, 832 F.3d at 286 (citations omitted).
Release No. 4197, 2015 WL 5472520, at *1 (S.E.C. Sept. 17, 2015).
195
Id. at *25.
196
Id.
197
Id. at *26.
198
Id.
199
Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 496 (2010)).
200
Id.
201
Id. at *27.
202
Id. at *27–28.
194
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found that the Commission’s decision does not apply to
independent agency employees, as that would not trigger a
separation of powers problem.203 Second, even if ALJs were
considered officers, PCAOB Board members have duties
drastically different from ALJs—they were “ ‘empowered to take
significant enforcement actions’ and engage in the ‘daily exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.’ ”204 Third, different from ALJs who
are subject to immediate SEC review, the “PCAOB had
‘significant independence in determining its priorities and
intervening in the affairs of regulated firms . . . without
Commission preapproval or direction.’ ”205 Finally, the Supreme
Court was concerned about the PCAOB’s lack of historical
precedent, not knowing its effect on Presidential authority; this
is not the case for the ALJ system, which “has been working
effectively for almost 70 years.”206
In consequence, the
Commission rejected the dual-layered tenure protection claim
against its ALJs.207
B.

The Impact of Article II Claims on Independent Agencies
Outside the SEC

As noted in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund,
there are twenty-eight agencies that, together, employ a total of
1,584 ALJs.208 Therefore, it is likely that other agencies will look
to the SEC ALJ controversy to see how it will affect their own use
of ALJs. Likewise, it also makes sense to look to see how other
independent agencies addressed this issue, such as the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”).

203

Id. at *27.
Id.
205
Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 505 (2010)).
206
Id. at *28.
207
Id.
208
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 586 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204
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How the FTC Handled Constitutional Challenges Against Its
ALJs

The FTC recently issued a final decision in In re LabMD,
Inc.209 Corporations subject to FTC regulations challenged that
the FTC’s administrative proceedings were unconstitutional
pursuant to the Appointments Clause.210 During the enforcement
procedure, the FTC remained in full control over the
adjudication, even after it assigned the action to a Commissionemployed ALJ.211
Analogous to SEC enforcement action
processes, FTC ALJs issue initial decisions, the FTC conducts de
novo review, and then adopts ALJ decisions in whole, in part, or
set aside altogether.212 Ultimately, the FTC held that its ALJs
were mere employees of the Commission due to their limited
authority.213
However, the FTC added an additional conclusion. It held
that, in the event its ALJ is considered an inferior officer, the
head of the FTC—an Article II principal agent—“ratified Judge
Chappell’s appointment as an [FTC ALJ] and as the
Commission’s Chief [ALJ].”214 The FTC made exactly the “quick
fix” that Judge May had originally suggested the SEC take.215 In
effect, although the FTC concluded its ALJ was not an inferior
officer, it endured the extra step to potentially cure subsequent
Appointments Clause challenges made by FTC-regulated
corporations.

209

No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *1 (F.T.C. Sept. 14, 2015).
Id. The FTC also referenced the Buckley definition of inferior officer—“one
who exercis[es] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per
curiam)).
211
Id.
212
Id. at *2.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix To Ward Off ALJ
Constitutional Challenges, REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/
alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitution
al-challenges.
210
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Legislation Answering the PTO ALJ Appointments Clause
Issue

In 2008, Congress amended Title 35 of the United States
Code and the Trademark Act of 1946.216 The amendment was in
response to the growing concerns raised against the
constitutionality of the Director of the PTO who appointed the
Administrative Patent and Trademark Judges (collectively,
“APJs”).217 As part of a legislative change in 2000, the law
provided that APJs were to be appointed by the Director of the
PTO, rather than by the Secretary of Commerce—the
department head who was initially authorized to appoint such
officers.218 However, after eight years of litigating the 2000
amendment, Congress thought it was necessary to change the
law again.219 Congress argued that, because intellectual property
has a significant impact on the U.S. economy, and the success of
the industry has been largely due to protections afforded to
industry players, the amended appointment of APJs was wholly
justified to remove any doubts that the appointments were
unconstitutional.220 Indeed, for there to be a constitutional
concern with the appointor of the APJs, it is inferred that
Congress categorized APJs to be inferior officers and appointed
by department heads.221
To cure the constitutional dilemma, Congress enacted a
three-part plan.222 First, the Secretary of Commerce became the
department head authorized to make the appointment.223
Second, the Secretary was permitted to “retroactively appoint

216
Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 110–313, § 1, 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15
(2008) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)).
217
154 CONG. REC. 16,853 (2008). The D.C. Circuit held in dicta that APJs are
inferior officers on grounds that they are like STJs of the Tax Court in Freytag.
Stryker Spine v. Biedermann Motech GmbH, 684 F. Supp. 2d 68, 84, 84 n.15 (D.C.
Cir. 2010). APJs are officers “established by Law” and have the power to “run trials,
take evidence, rule on admissibility, and compel compliance with discovery orders.”
John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 904, 907 (2009) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 41.125 (2016)). However, unlike SEC
ALJs, APJs are members of the appeals board, and thus are authorized by law to
render final decisions for the PTO. Id.
218
Stryker Spine, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000)).
219
Id.
220
154 CONG. REC. 16853 (2008).
221
See id. at 16853–54.
222
Id. at 16853.
223
Id.
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administrative judges who have been acting as de facto judges.”224
Third, the bill gave a defense to these de facto judges to counter
challenges made against their decisions that were submitted
before their constitutional reappointment.225 The latter two
prongs were added because Congress was concerned with those
hundreds of decisions rendered pre-enactment by de facto judges,
which would have been “constitutionally suspect if challenged.”226
To “ensure certainty in the market and to end unnecessary
litigation,” Congress explicitly addressed these concerns with the
de facto officer doctrine: “empower[ing] the Secretary to ‘deem’ or
ratify all the appointments made by the PTO Director,” and
creating the defense to make all those decisions submitted by de
facto judges immune from collateral attack.227 These proposals
became law on August 12, 2008.228
III. A FIX TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUARREL
SEC-hired ALJs are indeed inferior officers, and not mere
employees.
Thus, the SEC Commissioners, as established
department heads, will be the officers responsible for appointing
ALJs. Moreover, although considered inferior officers, SEC
ALJs’ dual-layer protection does not impose any significant
limitation on Presidential powers.
A.

SEC ALJs Are Inferior Officers

Inferior officer has no concrete meaning other than the
inconclusive language of the Appointments Clause. Due to this
inconclusive language, the term “inferior officer” has been best
construed to mean “[a] United States officer appointed by the
President, by a court, or by the head of a federal department” and
“[a]n officer who is subordinate to another officer.”229

224
Id. (emphasis added). A de facto judge is defined as “[a] judge operating
under color of law but whose authority is procedurally defective, such as a judge
appointed under an unconstitutional statute.” De Facto Judge, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
225
154 CONG. REC. 16853 (2008).
226
Id. at 16854.
227
Id. at 16853–54.
228
Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 110–313, § 1, 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15
(2008) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)).
229
Inferior Officer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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The SEC-hired ALJs are inferior officers as defined by the
United States Supreme Court, rather than mere employees.
First, in Buckley v. Valeo,230 the Supreme Court described
“Officer of the United States” to include “any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States.”231
The Court further acknowledged that
“Officer,” as used in Article II, was defined to be an inclusive
term.232 As support, the Court emphasized that it had previously
established inferior officers to include “postmaster[s]”233 and
“clerk[s] of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”234 Both positions involved an
individual that reported directly to an officer appointed by the
President. In the first case, postmasters were “responsible for a
local branch of the post office”235 and were beneath the
Postmaster General—“[t]he head of the U.S. Postal Service.”236
In the second case, a clerk was appointed, supervised, and
removed by the judge he or she was hired to assist in the United
States District Court.237 In addition, as argued in Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court
previously categorized, among other positions, clerks in the
Department of the Treasury, assistant-surgeons and cadetengineers appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, election
monitors, federal marshals, and military judges as inferior
officers.238
To further expand the inferior officer term, in Edmond v.
United States,239 Justice Scalia reengineered the earlier fourprong “officer” test in Morrison v. Olson240 with a simpler model
that emphasized whether or not the individual had a
supervisor.241 In particular, Justice Scalia held, “[I]n the context

230

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 126.
232
Id.
233
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 60 (1926).
234
Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 225, 225 (1839).
235
Postmaster, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
236
Postmaster General, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
237
See Hennen, 38 U.S. at 226.
238
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
239
520 U.S. 651 (1997).
240
487 U.S. 654, 671–73 (1988).
241
Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (1998) (citing
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662).
231
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of [the Appointments Clause] . . . we think it evident that
‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate.”242 By making this determination, the Edmond Court
found Military Appeals Court judges to be inferior officers
because they were monitored by the Judge Advocate General and
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.243 Indeed, Justice
Scalia went further to conclude that “[b]ased on this
supervision . . . [Military] Appeals Court judges ‘have no power to
render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless
permitted to do so by other Executive officers.’ ”244
Second, the SEC and enforcement action defendants have
analogized SEC ALJs to or distinguished them from STJs in the
Freytag decision. However, Justice Blackmun’s decision found
STJs to be inferior officers not because they can render decisions
of the Tax Court under §§ 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3), and (c), but
because they perform “more than ministerial tasks.”245 In
addition to the Court’s emphasis on STJs being “established by
Law” and holding statutory “duties, salary, and means of
appointment,” the Court ultimately concluded that STJs “take
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence,
and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders”—all of which are “exercise[ed] [with] significant
discretion.”246
To this end, even though the court in Landry might find the
line between mere employees and inferior officers to be anything
but bright, the line between inferior officers and SEC-hired ALJs
is nonexistent. In particular, the SEC stated in each of its final
decisions: “[T]he Commission’s ALJs conduct hearings, take
testimony, rule on admissibility of evidence, and issue
subpoenas.”247 SEC ALJs can also issue sanctions,248 administer

242

Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
See Bravin, supra note 241, at 1118.
244
Id. at 1119 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665).
245
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991).
246
Id.
247
Timbervest, LLC, Release No. 4197, 2015 WL 5472520, at *24 (S.E.C. Sept.
17, 2015); Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (Lucia I), Release No. 4190, 2015 WL
5172953, at *22 (S.E.C. Sept. 3, 2015).
248
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 201.180 (2016).
243
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oaths,249 and take depositions.250 As Freytag and Edmond made
clear, although ALJs only issue initial decisions as opposed to
final decisions, such reason does not effectively impact the
inferior officer designation.251 This idea was also delineated in
Landry’s concurring opinion: “The fact that an ALJ cannot
render a final decision and is subject to the ultimate supervision
of the FDIC shows only that the ALJ shares the common
characteristics of an ‘inferior Officer.’ ”252
Accordingly, to hold that SEC-hired ALJs are not inferior
officers would go against Supreme Court principles. Although
ALJs can be distinguished from STJs in many ways, the principle
similarities they do share are the ones that consider them
inferior officers. SEC ALJs have statutory roots, well-established
duties, and discretion within the SEC, despite them being placed
under the Commission’s supervision.
B.

SEC Commissioners Shall Appoint ALJs and Endure the
Protections of the De Facto Officer Doctrine

An immediate effect of ALJs being inferior officers is that
they are subject to restrictions of the Appointments Clause. The
SEC indicated that “[i]t is undisputed that [its ALJs were] not
appointed by the President, the head of a department, or a court
of law.”253 SEC ALJ Elliot added that he simply sent in his
resume, was offered an interview, and received the job.254 The
hiring process was disconnected from the Commission; it did not
issue an order appointing Judge Elliot as an ALJ.255 As a result,
the most effective constitutional resolution, despite some
criticism against it, is to follow Judge May’s “simple fix”256 and
249
250

5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(1) (2012).
Id. § 556(c)(4); see also Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179–81 (10th Cir.

2016).
251

See supra Section I.D.1.
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
253
Timbervest, LLC, Release No. 4197, 2015 WL 5472520, at *23 (S.E.C. Sept.
17, 2015); Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (Lucia I), Release No. 4190, 2015 WL
5172953, at *21 (S.E.C. Sept. 3, 2015).
254
Trial Transcript Day 19 at. 4472–73, Bebo, File No. 3-16293 (S.E.C. June 19,
2015), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/sec-june-23-notice-in-timb
ervest-administrative-proceeding.pdf.
255
Id. at 4474.
256
Ironridge Glob. IV, Ltd. v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2512-LMM, 2015 WL 7273262,
at *18 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2015) (reaffirming the court’s earlier conclusion that the
252
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have the Commission reappoint its five ALJs.257 But, in addition
to Judge May’s simple fix, this resolution must also contain a
retroactive de facto judge defense.258
Defense attorneys representing financial entities explained
that Judge May’s solution was untenable because any
reappointment made by the SEC “could be construed as an
admission that their previous appointments were constitutionally
unsound.”259 Thus, the attorneys argued that any previous
decision, or pending case, before an SEC ALJ will be
constitutionally challenged.260 To the extent these concerns are
valid, Congress already answered similar concerns in the 2008
amendment to the Trademark Act of 1946.261 Even if Congress
does not enact an express de facto defense to safeguard the SEC
in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, courts will still not
entertain these claims due to the de facto officer doctrine.
The de facto officer doctrine was exercised in various
Supreme Court cases, as discussed herein, to facilitate
retroactive application. In Buckley, the Court insisted that the
Commission’s “inability to exercise certain powers because of the
method by which its members have been selected should not
affect the validity of the Commission’s administrative actions and
determinations.”262 In response to such statement, the Court
rendered de facto validity.263 Similarly, in Ryder v. United States,
the Court again acknowledged that “[t]he de facto officer doctrine
confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the
color of official title even though it is later discovered that the
legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is
deficient.”264
SEC Commissioners should reappoint the ALJs themselves to cure the Appointment
issue); Frankel, supra note 157.
257
Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), (noting that the
court’s conclusion appears “unduly technical, as the ALJ’s appointment could easily
be cured by having the SEC Commissioners issue an appointment”), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
258
See supra notes 220–224 and accompanying text.
259
See Frankel, supra note 157.
260
Id.
261
See supra Section II.B.2.
262
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam).
263
Id.
264
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995) (citing Norton v. Shelby
Cty., 118 U.S. 425, 440 (1886)). The Supreme Court adopted such doctrine for the
very purpose that absurd results would ensue if it were to allow repetitious suits
that challenged every action taken by an official whose claim to office was called into
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In Ryder, the Court listed three cases where it previously
used the de facto officer doctrine, all of which included
defendants who failed to bring an objection against the judges’
unconstitutional appointment at the time of the hearing.265 The
defendants raised such objection only in response to the judges’
ruling against them.266 In all three cases, the Supreme Court
held that the judges’ holdings were not open to collateral
attack267 and “[were] not open to question.”268 In contrast, the
Ryder case, unlike the challengers in the other three cases, had a
petitioner who raised the constitutionality issue regarding the
judges’ titles before those very judges and prior to the
commencement of the action.269 The Court held: “We think that
one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of
the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case is entitled
to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief
may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.”270 In sum, the
Supreme Court encouraged any objections raised against
unconstitutionally appointed judges; however, the Court also
made clear that such objections had to be raised before the
proceedings commenced. This approach effectively eliminated
attacks on prior and pending decisions administered by the de
facto judges.
Congress enacted this doctrine with respect to APJs within
the PTO. Just like the financial industry, the patent and
trademark industry largely depends on the decisions made by its
ALJs.271 And, just like the SEC ALJs, APJs were appointed by
non-Article II-source principal officers.272 To nip the appointment
issue in the bud, Congress first restored the appointment
authority in the Secretary of Commerce and second, adopted the
de facto judge doctrine to both constitutionalize the ALJs’
question. Id. (citing 63A AM. JUR. 2d, Public Officers and Employees § 578, at 1080–
81 (1984)).
265
Id. at 181–82 (citing Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891); McDowell v.
United States, 159 U.S. 596 (1895); Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452 (1899)).
266
See Ward, 173 U.S. at 455–56; McDowell, 159 U.S. at 601; Ball, 140 U.S. at
128–29.
267
See Ward, 173 U.S. at 456; McDowell, 159 U.S. at 601; Ball, 140 U.S. at 128–
29.
268
McDowell, 159 U.S. at 601.
269
Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182.
270
Id. at 182–83.
271
154 CONG. REC. 16853 (2008).
272
See id.
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appointment to the date they were originally appointed and to
defend against any attacks to prior decisions by making the
constitutional appointment apply retroactively.273 Indeed, no
patent and trademark precedent exists that would impugn the
Legislature’s resolution to the Appointments Clause issue.274
Therefore, “Congress . . . retains authority to confer validity on
determinations
adjudicated
by
previously
appointed
[administrative] judges and can look to its 2008 modification of
the administrative patent-adjudication system as a roadmap for
success.”275
In effect, just as Congress answered the constitutional
concerns in the patent and trademark industry, the financial
industry can also make these changes to bring it within the
constitutional scope. Similar to the Secretary of Commerce—a
position that satisfies the heads of department—the SEC
Commissioners also hold Article II-source status. First, keeping
the appointment within the SEC makes this resolution practical,
as any changes made to this agency will certainly have broad
impacts on other independent agencies.
It would also be
unrealistic for Congress to change the appointment power of
ALJs to a third-party, or even to an entirely different branch of
government.276 Such proposal might suggest that not only will
the five SEC ALJs be appointed by a third-party, but also the
remaining 1,500 ALJs from the other agencies.
Second, although enabling the Commission to appoint their
own ALJs would seem to invite bias, this will not be the case.
The selection process is, and always has been, quarterbacked by
the OPM, the office responsible for administering an objective
examination that ranks each ALJ applicant.277 From there, the
Chief SEC ALJ and interview committee select the top three test
scores and narrow the candidates to the number of ALJs they
need.278 Instead of subjecting the Chief SEC ALJ’s recommended
applicant to the Commission’s Office of Human Resources for
273

Id.
Greg Louer, Comment, Copyright at a Crossroad: Why Improper Appointment
of Copyright Royalty Judges Could Undermine American Copyright Law, and How
Congress Can Solve the Problem, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 183, 208 (2010).
275
Id.
276
For a complete discussion on outer-branch appointment, see Barnett, supra
note 1, at 832–60.
277
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
278
See id.
274
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final approval, the applicant will be subject to the
Commissioners’ final approval. Accordingly, the objective hiring
process in place at the beginning of the application process
ensures that the Commissioners can only give final approval of
the ALJs who were selected for having the best qualifications.
Once SEC Commissioners constitutionally appoint the
ALJs—the proposal made by Judge May279—it then becomes of
utmost importance to make sure these administrative
proceedings run efficiently and effectively. Thus, it would
behoove the SEC to have Congress enact the de facto judge
doctrine in its administrative enforcement actions. As a result,
any prior or pending proceeding conducted by an ALJ who was
unconstitutionally appointed by the SEC Office of Human
Resources will not be impaired after the Commission
constitutionally reappoints its ALJs. Put differently, this would
eliminate any invitation for enforcement action defendants to
bring attacks on prior or pending decisions submitted by de facto
ALJs. Consequently, not only will the appointment of SEC ALJs
be constitutional, but the de facto judge doctrine will answer and
remedy any initial reservation regarding the potential for an
increased flux of unnecessary litigation.
C.

Double Layer Protection Afforded to SEC-Hired ALJs Is
Constitutional

The second Article II challenge should be upheld as
constitutional, as multilevel protection from removal granted to
SEC ALJs is not contrary to the Article’s vesting of executive
power in the President. It is determined that independent
agencies are headed by principal officers who may be removed for
cause.280 Thus, SEC Commissioners, as principal officers, do not
violate Article II because they have a single layer of for-cause
protection. The issue is within the ALJs’ additional layer of
protection, which allegedly limits the President’s ability to
remove an inferior officer.
First, pursuant to earlier Supreme Court decisions, SEC
ALJs’ second layer of tenure protection, as inferior officers, is
constitutional pursuant to Article II. In United States v. Perkins,

279

Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and
remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
280
See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
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the Court held that because Congress gave department heads the
authority to appoint inferior officers, Congress implied that those
same department heads are also limited in removing such
officers, as it is “deem[ed] best for the public interest.”281 Indeed,
this holding illustrates that it is constitutionally permissible to
grant principal officers one layer of protection and inferior
officers their own layer of protection as a safeguard to insulate
them from improper removal by their department heads.
Second, Free Enterprise Fund’s holding has no control over
the dual tenure protection granted to SEC-hired ALJs.
Notwithstanding its narrow holding that only addressed the
PCAOB’s added level of protection that deprived the President of
adequate control,282 the Court emphasized that the PCAOB,
unlike other inferior officers, had a greater impact on the
President’s oversight due to the PCAOB’s own superior power.283
The PCAOB’s executorial-like powers render its tenure
provisions incompatible with the Constitution’s separation of
powers principle. The argument that Free Enterprise Fund is
analogous to ALJs because they are both inferior officers is
baseless. The Court even addressed that its holding does not
apply to ALJs, because, unlike the PCAOB who enforces, and
separately, engages in policymaking, ALJs perform strictly
adjudicative functions that require approval from their
supervisor—the Commission.284
Third, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund
should be embraced as the logical conclusion for ALJs’
constitutional dual-layer tenure protection. He first argued that
the majority’s reasoning for restriction on Presidential control
was circular.285 Even though the Court found the Board’s powers
to be executive in nature, the dissent put forth a list of provisions
that prove the Commission had complete power over the
PCAOB.286 Similar to the dissent’s view of the Commission’s

281
282

116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508

(2010).
283

See id. at 498.
Id. at 507 n.10.
285
See id. at 530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
286
Id. at 528–29. The following includes a list of statutory provisions
illustrating the SEC’s control over the PCAOB: (1) the SEC must approve each rule;
(2) the SEC may abrogate, delete or add to any rule promulgated by the PCAOB;
284
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power over the Board, the Commission also has absolute control
over the decisions of ALJs. Consequently, “if the President’s
control over the Commission is sufficient, and the Commission’s
control over the Board [or ALJs] is virtually absolute, then, as a
practical matter, the President’s control over the Board [or ALJs]
should prove sufficient as well.”287
But, assuming the Commission does not have the same type
of absolute control over the PCAOB as it does with ALJs, Justice
Breyer highlighted the importance and purpose of having an
added layer of tenure protection for those inferior officers who
engage in adjudicatory functions.288 Such functions, in which
ALJs engage, require the need for an additional for-cause
removal process to detach those positions from political
influence.289 Because SEC ALJs can only be removed by the
Commission for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office,”290 ALJs may decide cases with the correct application of
securities laws, rather than become burdened with any political
motives that may emerge.
In sum, without having to apply the ruling in Free Enterprise
Fund to the dual-layer tenure protection of SEC-hired ALJs, the
controlling constitutional standard remains in the Humphrey’s
Executor decision: “Congress may constitutionally ‘limit and
restrict’ the Commission’s power to remove those [inferior
officers] they appoint.”291 Therefore, the ALJs multilevel tenure
protection fails to violate the Constitution’s separation of powers,
as SEC ALJs do not interfere with the Executive’s ability to
exercise power over inferior officers.
CONCLUSION
The ALJ-as-inferior officer debate is paramount to the future
of SEC enforcement actions. The controversial provisions of
Dodd-Frank were the tipping point for SEC regulated and
unregulated entities.
This prompted enforcement action
(3) the SEC may modify, enhance, cancel or reduce any sanction made by the
PCAOB; and (4) the SEC may restrict or direct PCAOB’s conduct. Id.
287
Id. at 530.
288
See id. (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623–28
(1935)).
289
Id. at 531–32. This is another instrument in place to ensure that financial
defendants receive the very due process they are challenging.
290
5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
291
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 535 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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defendants to challenge their administrative proceedings in
federal court. With the heightened use of ALJs, which embodied
the broader principles of Congress’s proactive steps to regulate
the financial industry, legislative action must be taken to adjust
SEC administrative proceedings within the letter of the
Constitution. Accordingly, supported by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Appointments Clause, this Note suggests
that SEC ALJs are inferior officers who shall be appointed by
SEC Commissioners and have the protections under the de facto
judge doctrine. Moreover, this Note concludes that SEC ALJs’
multi-tiered tenure protection remains constitutional, as there is
no basis to support a separation of powers claim.

